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Abstract
A considerable literature on attribution theory has shown that healthy individuals exhibit a
positivity bias when inferring the causes of evaluative feedback on their performance. They
tend to attribute positive feedback internally (e.g., to their own abilities) but negative feed-
back externally (e.g., to environmental factors). However, all empirical demonstrations of
this bias suffer from at least one of the three following drawbacks: First, participants directly
judge explicit causes for their performance. Second, participants have to imagine events
instead of experiencing them. Third, participants assess their performance only after receiv-
ing feedback and thus differences in baseline assessments cannot be excluded. It is there-
fore unclear whether the classically reported positivity bias generalizes to setups without
these drawbacks. Here, we aimed at establishing the relevance of attributions for decision-
making by showing an attribution-related positivity bias in a decision-making task. We
developed a novel task, which allowed us to test how participants changed their evaluations
in response to positive and negative feedback about performance. Specifically, we used
videos of actors expressing different facial emotional expressions. Participants were first
asked to evaluate the actors’ credibility in expressing a particular emotion. After this initial
rating, participants performed an emotion recognition task and did—or did not—receive
feedback on their veridical performance. Finally, participants re-rated the actors’ credibility,
which provided a measure of how they changed their evaluations after feedback. Attribution
theory predicts that participants change their evaluations of the actors’ credibility toward the
positive after receiving positive performance feedback and toward the negative after nega-
tive performance feedback. Our results were in line with this prediction. A control condition
without feedback showed that correct or incorrect performance alone could not explain the
observed positivity bias. Furthermore, participants’ behavior in our task was linked to the
most widely used measure of attribution style. In sum, our findings suggest that positive and
negative performance feedback influences the evaluation of task-related stimuli, as
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581 February 5, 2016 1 / 19
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Korn CW, Rosenblau G, Rodriguez Buritica
JM, Heekeren HR (2016) Performance Feedback
Processing Is Positively Biased As Predicted by
Attribution Theory. PLoS ONE 11(2): e0148581.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581
Editor: Thomas Boraud, Centre national de la
recherche scientifique, FRANCE
Received: July 16, 2015
Accepted: January 19, 2016
Published: February 5, 2016
Copyright: © 2016 Korn et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Funding: This work was supported by Excellence
Initiative of the German Federal Ministry of Education
and Research Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Grant EXC 302. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
predicted by attribution theory. Therefore, our study points to the relevance of attribution
theory for feedback processing in decision-making and provides a novel outlook for deci-
sion-making biases.
Introduction
The ambiguous nature of causality assessments and their relation to self-related positivity
biases have long been acknowledged within the context of attribution theory, which ranks as
one of the central psychological theories to describe motivated behavior in humans ([1,2]; see
[3,4] for an overview of its historical development). Its main tenet states that future behavior
depends on the evaluation of the causes for performance feedback (e.g., results of a mathemat-
ics exam), which is often dichotomized into conveying correct performance (or success) and
incorrect performance (or failure) [2]. Potential causes are classified along three dimensions
that span a matrix of possible causal explanations: i) locus: internal versus external, ii) stability:
stable versus unstable, and iii) globality: global versus specific causes [5]. Some formulations of
attribution theory focus on controllability as the third dimension [2]. Thus, negative feedback
conveying incorrect task performance can be ascribed to multiple causes (e.g., lack of ability,
task difficulty, or bad luck) and individuals may infer the most likely cause for negative feed-
back in a self-serving way [1,2].
Causality attributions and motivational biases
Considerable research has shown that meta-cognitive assessments of causality create some lee-
way for motivational biases such that correct performance is ascribed to internal factors (e.g.,
one’s own ability) and incorrect performance is more likely attributed externally (e.g., task dif-
ficulty or bad luck) [6–8]. For example, students tend to ascribe their good performance in a
mathematics exam to a high level of ability but their poor performance to an unjustifiably diffi-
cult test [9]. This classic self-related positivity bias, often referred to as the “self-serving bias”, is
supposed to play an important, adaptive role for maintaining psychological well-being and
mental health [6]. The opposite tendency, ascribing negative events to internal, stable, or global
factors, is associated with a higher number of depressive symptoms [7,10].
Established measures of causality attributions
The empirical assessments of attributional styles in healthy and clinical populations have vastly
relied on explicit, verbal self-reports of inferred causality. Typically, participants are asked to
write down and/or rate the most likely causes for hypothetical events, real life events, or perfor-
mance feedback on an experimental task. The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) [5] and
its variants constitute the most widely used self-report measure and assess the attribution of
hypothetical events on the dimensions locus, stability, and globality. In a meta-analysis of the
self-serving bias in attribution [7], 54% of the included effect sizes were based on variants of
the ASQ and an additional 10% on similar measures (see Table 7 in [7]). The remaining 36% of
the effect sizes were derived from studies that used some kind of experimental manipulation
but all of them prompted participants to provide or rate explicit causes. Similarly, most neuro-
scientific studies on attribution used stimuli adapted from the ASQ [11–14], while some of
them employed feedback on cognitive [15] or emotional [16] tasks but still asked participants
to explicitly choose between different causal explanations. Undoubtedly, these explicit mea-
sures of attributional styles have the advantage of precisely translating attribution theory into
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empirical investigation. However, previous demonstrations of an attribution-related positivity
bias suffer from at least one of three drawbacks.
Drawbacks of established measures
The first and most important drawback is that explicit assessments of causality lack generaliz-
ability to real life situations. In most real life situations (for example the school setting),
humans process feedback implicitly (i.e., spontaneously and without conscious effort or con-
trol) [17]. Implicit processes mediate different behavioral aspects than explicit processes [18]
and can only be measured indirectly. To provide a striking example from another domain, a
person with implicit racial prejudices might display a particular bias on an implicit task, with-
out reporting prejudices when asked explicitly [19,20]. Therefore, implicit tasks have become
more and more common especially in the domain of social decision-making (see [18,21] for
reviews and [22] for a recent example).
A second drawback is that most assessments of causality involve hypothetical and/or loosely
defined events, which the participants have to imagine (e.g., in the ASQ). Due to the ambiguous
nature of hypothetical events (the underlying action-feedback contingencies are undefined),
the exact triggers for a person’s attribution processes remain elusive.
A third drawback is that in most tasks participants are asked to provide a single rating for
the relevant stimuli. Therefore, baseline differences that are independent of performance feed-
back cannot be excluded.
Advantages of decision-making tasks
In contrast, studies in decision (neuro)science have used tasks that do not suffer from the draw-
backs mentioned above to measure implicit attitudes, affective states, or information process-
ing biases [23–26]. First, participants’ beliefs are mostly assessed in the form of implicit ratings
or choices and not explicit verbal reports. Second, decision-making tasks use narrowly defined
real life events and/or clear-cut feedback during the task itself. Third, decision-making tasks
often repeatedly assess participants’ beliefs to investigate how they dynamically change due to
obtained feedback. Negative feedback due to incorrect task performance, for example, should
lead to greater efforts to improve performance in the future. Indeed, research in decision
(neuro)science has made great strides in describing feedback processing, often with the help of
computational models (e.g., reinforcement learning or drift-diffusion models) [27–32].
Decision-making tasks and motivational biases
Crucially, dynamically assessing participants’ beliefs before and after self-relevant feedback has
revealed self-related positivity biases in feedback processing. Healthy humans update their
beliefs more after receiving desirable than after receiving undesirable information: When par-
ticipants are provided with the true base rates of clearly defined adverse life events they adjust
their beliefs more for desirable information (i.e., after initial overestimations) than for undesir-
able information (i.e., after initial underestimations) [33,34]. Relatedly, social feedback from
peers on character traits leads to a greater change of participants’ self-evaluations when the
feedback is desirable than when it is undesirable [35,36].
Open questions
It is an open question whether the self-serving bias reported in the attribution literature (see
[7] for a meta-analysis) emerges in a well-controlled setup akin to those commonly used in the
decision-making literature (see [27–32] for reviews). More generally, it is unclear whether
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attributions are relevant for decisions since theories on decision-making typically neglect that
performance feedback can have multiple causes and that the ascribed causes may taint future
beliefs and decisions.
Aims and operationalization
Based on attribution theory, we predicted a positivity bias in the processing of performance
feedback. The aim of the current study was thus to establish the relevance of attribution theory
for decision-making by testing whether humans show positively biased processing of perfor-
mance feedback in a setup that controls for three drawbacks commonly present in investiga-
tions of attribution theory. Crucially, participants were not prompted to provide explicit
statements of causality. Rather they were asked to state their beliefs about the employed stimuli
before and after receiving performance feedback. We chose to operationalize performance
feedback in an emotion recognition task that comprised dynamic facial emotional expressions.
As dependent variables, we measured participants’ beliefs about the credibility of the depicted
emotion before and after the emotion recognition task. Positively biased attributions were
assessed as a “self-serving” change in belief: Incorrect performance should be attributed exter-
nally and thus result in a downgrading of the actor (“I performed incorrectly because the
actor’s depiction of the emotion was not credible—not because of a lack of emotion recognition
skills.”). In contrast, correct performance may lead to a more positive assessment of the actor.
Implementation with emotional facial expressions
We used emotional facial expressions because of their high social saliency [37]. Emotional
visual stimuli are detected faster [38–40] and recognized more accurately [41,42] than non-
emotional visual stimuli, in particular when the faces have dynamic properties [43,44].
Task overview and hypotheses
We used a within-subjects design with participants’ ratings as main dependent measure. Spe-
cifically, participants performed an emotion recognition task that included 96 video clips of
various actors depicting different facial emotions. In half of the trials, participants received the
veridical feedback on whether they correctly labeled the depicted facial emotion or not. In the
other half of the trials, no feedback was provided. Crucially, participants rated the actors’ credi-
bility in performing the facial emotions before and after the emotion recognition test. Thereby,
we could measure how participants updated their assessment of credibility depending on task
performance and performance feedback. We expected that participants would make updates
toward the positive (i.e., higher second credibility rating) after feedback on correct task perfor-
mance. After feedback on incorrect task performance, participants were expected to make
updates toward the negative (i.e., lower second credibility rating). The condition, in which par-
ticipants received no feedback, served as a control condition: We expected this differential
updating to be absent or reduced when no performance feedback was provided. To explore
how the behavioral pattern in our task may relate to classic measures of attribution, we corre-
lated update scores with scores on the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ).
Methods
Participants
Participants (n = 25, 20 female, mean age = 26, SD = 3.8) were recruited via flyers and mailing
lists at the Freie Universität Berlin. They were paid 10 € for participating in the experiment,
which took approximately one hour to complete. The study was approved by the ethics
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committee of the German Society for Psychology (DGPs). The individual depicted in Fig 1 in
this manuscript has given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to
publish these details.
Experimental set-up
Task instructions. The experiment took place in the testing rooms of the Freie Universität
Berlin under the supervision of a trained experimenter. Participants gave written informed
consent to participate in the study and filled out a demographic questionnaire. Subsequently,
they received a detailed written task instruction. To avoid potential biases, participants were
not supposed to know the real objective of this study. The introduction provided an incentive
for participants to perform well on the task. Participants were told that they would be presented
with a standardized emotion recognition test, which had been previously normed in a popula-
tion-based study. They were further told that, after the test, they would receive a report relating
their performance to the average performance of their age-and gender-based comparison
group. Prior to the test, participants were asked to rate the credibility of the actors portraying
the emotions displayed in the test items.
First credibility rating. In the first block of the experiment, participants rated the credibil-
ity of actors portraying different facial emotions (see Fig 1A). We explained to participants that
credibility ratings should capture how closely an actor’s portrayal resembled natural emotional
Fig 1. Task design. (A) In the first block, participants used a visual analogue scale to rate the credibility of different actors portraying different facial
emotions. In each of the 96 trials, participants first saw a dynamic video and then were asked to provide their rating while the last frame of the video remained
on screen as a still image. Each video item showed one of 26 actors depicting one of 23 different emotions. (B) In the second block, participants performed an
emotion recognition task followed by a second credibility rating. The correct emotion label was presented along with three distractors. We selected videos
and distractors so that overall task performance was around 50%. Immediately after the emotion recognition test, participants either received veridical
performance feedback or no feedback (“XXXXXX”). Update scores were calculated as the difference between second and first credibility ratings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581.g001
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expressions that participants encounter in everyday life. This, we told them, would provide us
with an additional validity assessment of the emotion recognition test.
Participants were presented with 96 video items of 26 actors (13 female) depicting one of 23
different types of facial emotions (see Stimuli for details). For each video item, participants rated
how credible the actors’ performance was on a visual analogue scale ranging from low to high
credibility. Specifically, in each trial a fixation cross was presented (1 s) before the video clip (3 s).
The last frame of the video remained on the screen as a still images when participants were
prompted to rate the actors’ credibility using a slider, which had a resolution of 270 positions. The
slider was adapted from one of our previous studies [45]. Participants moved the slider leftwards
or rightwards using the corresponding arrow keys and confirmed their choices by pressing the
“down” arrow key. If participants responded within 8 s, they saw a confirmation of their choice
for 0.5 s; otherwise they saw the prompt “too slow” on the screen. Trial order was pseudo-ran-
domized for each participant so that no emotion type and no actor occurred two times in a row.
Emotion recognition test and second credibility rating. In the second block, participants
performed an emotion recognition test including all previously rated video items (see Fig 1B).
We informed participants that during the emotion recognition test, they would sometimes
receive feedback on whether or not they solved the items correctly, while other times they
would not get feedback. Participants were asked to solve the emotion recognition task as
quickly and accurately as possible. After solving each item, they would have to rate the credibil-
ity of the actor’s depiction of the facial emotion in the same fashion as they had done in the
first block. Specifically, in each trial a fixation cross (1 s) was presented before the video clip (3
s) with four emotion adjectives (e.g., confused, contemptuous, offended, envious). The last
frame of the video remained on the screen and participants had 8 s to indicate the correct
adjective for the depicted emotion using the keys 1, 2, 3, or 4. Again participants saw the
prompt “too slow” if they did not respond within the time frame of 8 s. After another fixation
cross (1 s), participants received feedback on their task performance in half of the trials (3 s;
“Your answer in the emotion recognition test was correct/incorrect”). In the other half of the
trials, participants received no feedback (“XXXXXX”). Then they were asked to rate the actors’
credibility a second time using the slider as in the first block of the experiment. Again trial
order was pseudo-randomized so that no emotion type and no actor occurred two or three
times in a row. Within each trial the order of the emotion adjectives was randomized. For the
assignment of the condition (feedback versus no feedback), the 96 video items were split into
two lists (see Stimuli). The assignment of the two lists to the feedback versus no feedback con-
dition was counterbalanced across participants. The experiment was presented using the soft-
ware Presentation (Version 14.1, Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA).
Attributional Style Questionnaire
After the experiment participants completed the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ)
[5,46]. The ASQ is a self-report questionnaire that classifies a person’s explanatory style for 12
hypothetical events (half bad and half good) using three causal dimensions: internal versus
external, stable versus unstable, and global versus specific causes. Participants were asked to
write down the one major cause of each event and then rate the cause along a 7-point contin-
uum for each of the three causal dimensions (internality, stability, and globality). Completion
of the questionnaire was self-paced. Two participants were not assessed on the ASQ. Two par-
ticipants did not complete the ASQ.
Participants were debriefed after the experiment. They were informed about the real objec-
tive of the experiment and told that they would not receive a performance report, as the test
was not standardized.
Attribution Bias on Performance Feedback Processing
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Stimuli
To increase the ecological validity of the experiment, the 96 stimuli used in the emotion recog-
nition test were video sequences (video duration: 3s) depicting 23 emotional facial expressions
portrayed by 26 professional actors (13 female). We included 2 to 6 emotional expressions
from each actor (see S1 Table). The included emotions were selected on the basis of a previous
study that classified emotional words according to their valence and arousal as well as their
communicative frequency in everyday life [47]. Compared to most established emotion recog-
nition tests, our test comprised a larger number of different emotions, which also included
basic emotions (e.g., angry, sad) that have been shown to involve universal, highly stereotypical
physiological reactions [48,49]. For more information on stimulus production and stimulus
validation procedure please refer to [50].
Prior to the study, we validated the task with 144 video items, portrayed by 28 actors (15
female), in a separate sample of 14 pilot participants (11 female, mean age = 24.6, SD = 2.74).
Since our task design requires a splitting into correctly and incorrectly answered items, the
pilot study served the purpose of excluding items with a floor or ceiling effect on correctness in
the emotion recognition task. We excluded items, which were answered correctly by less than
14% or more than 93% participants in the pilot study. Additionally, we selected items so that
the mean item correctness of the selected items was approximately 50%. A mean item correct-
ness of around 50% ensures a balanced task design (50% of the times participants would get
the feedback that they solved the item correctly or incorrectly).
Based on this criterion, we included 96 items in our final stimulus set. Participants in the
main study solved on average correctly 49% (SD = 8) of the final items. The average credibility
rating of the emotional expressions before the emotion recognition test was 49 (SD = 11) on a
scale ranging from 1 to 100 (see below). The 96 items were divided into two item lists (corre-
sponding to the two conditions of the experiment: feedback versus no feedback), each compris-
ing 48 items. The lists were closely matched with respect to the actors’ age group, gender,
valence, arousal and frequency of emotional expressions (see S1 Table) and were counterbal-
anced between conditions.
Data analysis
Trials for which participants failed to respond in the allotted time of maximally 8s for the first
or second ratings or the emotion recognition task were excluded from all analyses. Overall, par-
ticipants missed on average 1.24 trials (SD = 1.88). Mean reaction times (RTs) for correct and
incorrect performance in the emotion recognition task were compared using a paired t-test.
For the ratings, RTs could not be analyzed because participants answered via a visual analogue
scale with a slider that always started at the midpoint of the scale.
Credibility ratings and updates. All ratings were transformed from their original values
on the visual analogue scale to values on a scale ranging from 1 to 100. Update scores were cal-
culated as the difference between first and second ratings.
update ¼ second rating  first rating
Thus, positive updates indicate an increase in credibility ratings (a change towards the posi-
tive) while negative updates indicate a decrease in credibility ratings (a change towards the neg-
ative). We compared mean update scores as well as mean ﬁrst and second ratings per
participant and condition using repeated measures ANOVAs with two within-subjects factors
and follow-up t-tests.
Effects of the video items. To additionally account for the possible effects of the video
items, linear mixed effects models were set up using the function lmer implemented in the
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lme4 package of the software R (www.r-project.org). Independent variables were the updating
scores, first or second ratings of all answered trials for all individual participants. Fixed effects
comprised predictors for Condition and Correctness as well as their interaction. We included
random effects for participants and for video items, which included random intercepts and
random slopes for the highest interaction (i.e., the Condition X Correctness interaction) [51].
This is equivalent to the following R model formula.
Y  condition  correctnessþ ð1þ condition : correctness jparticipantsÞ þ ð1þ condition
: correctness j itemsÞ
Signiﬁcance levels of the ﬁxed effects interactions were determined by performing log-likeli-
hood tests, which compared the full model to a reduced model without the interaction factor.
Results
Mean update scores indicated a positivity bias following performance
feedback
In line with our main hypothesis that participants should update toward the positive after feed-
back on correct task performance but toward the negative after feedback on incorrect task per-
formance, we found a significant interaction on participants’ update scores in a Condition
(feedback given / no feedback given) by Correctness (correct / incorrect task performance)
ANOVA (both factors were within-subjects factors). For visualization see Fig 2A, for statistics
see Table 1. Additionally, the main effect of Correctness but not the main effect of Condition
reached significance. A follow-up t-test showed that when feedback was given updates follow-
ing correct performance were higher than updates following incorrect performance (t(24) =
-7.84; p< 10−6; all p-values Bonferroni corrected; in 24 out of 25 participants updates were
higher after correct versus incorrect performance). The same pattern albeit much less strongly
was observed for the condition in which no feedback was given (t(24) = -3.35; p< .05; in 19
out of 25 participants updates were higher after correct versus incorrect performance).
We also tested whether updates differed from zero when feedback was provided (i.e.,
whether there was a significant change from first to second credibility ratings). After correct
performance feedback, updates were above zero indicating a change toward the positive (one-
sample t-test against zero: t(24) = 3.39; p< .001). After incorrect performance feedback, they
were below zero indicating a change toward the negative (t(24) = -2.82; p< .05). Importantly,
when no feedback was given, updates did not differ from zero (all p’s> 0.2).
Taken together, our results indicate a positivity bias evidenced by changes in credibility rat-
ings following performance feedback. Notably, these changes were significantly smaller in a
control condition without feedback.
Control analyses using linear mixed effects models confirmed the
observed positivity bias
The above analyses on mean update scores per participant and condition treat participants as a
random effect but video items as fixed effect and thus allow no generalization across video
items. Therefore, we additionally used linear mixed effects models, which treated both partici-
pants and video items as random effects, to test whether the above described patterns for
update scores held. This was indeed the case (see Table 2). Crucially, the Condition X Correct-
ness interaction effect was significant for update scores as indicated by a t-value of 2.0 suggest-
ing that participants updated toward the positive after feedback on correct task performance
but toward the negative after feedback on incorrect task performance. When comparing the
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Fig 2. Ratings, updates, ASQ scores. (A) First credibility ratings (i.e., ratings before the emotion recognition task) lay around the midpoint of the scale.
Second credibility ratings were higher after correct performance feedback than after incorrect performance feedback. A similar pattern emerged to a much
lesser degree when no feedback was provided. For visualization, updates (i.e., the differences between second and first ratings) are plotted. (B) Relationship
Attribution Bias on Performance Feedback Processing
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full model against the model without the fixed effect of the interaction the comparison favored
the full model (χ2(1) = 16.30; p< 10−4; full model-BIC: 1034; reduced model-BIC: 1043; see
Table 2 for linear mixed effects models on first and second ratings).
In sum, a linear mixed effects model including a random effects term for video items con-
firmed the interaction effect shown by the ANOVA on mean update scores per participant and
condition.
Control analyses showed that the non-random assignment of correct
and incorrect trials did not drive the positivity bias
By design, the assignment of correct and incorrect performance feedback was not random
across trials. That is, it depended on participants’ responses in the emotion recognition task.
However, this did not drive our results. Firstly, there was no significant difference in the num-
ber of correctly solved items (t(24) = -0.130, p> .8) between conditions and thus participants’
performance in the recognition task resulted in a design that was balanced across participants.
Secondly, participants’ first credibility ratings and subsequent correct responses were indepen-
dent of each other (Fisher’s z transformed mean correlation overall participants: r = -0.035).
Thirdly, across participants the mean number of correctly solved items did not correlate with
between total ASQ scores for positive events with updates after receiving feedback for correct performance (left) and no relationship between total ASQ
scores for negative events with updates after receiving feedback for incorrect performance (right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581.g002
Table 1. Results from ANOVAs.
Effect F Df P ηp2
Updates (differences between ﬁrst and second credibility ratings) Condition < 1.00 1, 24 n.s. < .01
Correctness 50.14 1, 24 < 10−6 .68
Condition x correctness 8.56 1, 24 < .01 .26
First credibility ratings Condition < 1.00 1, 24 n.s. < .01
Correctness 2.44 1, 24 n.s. .09
Condition x correctness 5.58 1, 24 < .05 .19
Second credibility ratings Condition 0.05 1, 24 n.s. < .01
Correctness 43.56 1, 24 < 10−6 .65
Condition x correctness 33.21 1, 24 < 10−5 .58
Credibility ratings Condition 0.00 1, 24 n.s. .04
Correctness 11.45 1, 24 < 0.005 .32
Time 0.86 1, 24 n.s. .04
Condition x correctness 24.68 1, 24 < 10−4 .51
Condition x time 0.19 1, 24 n.s. < .01
Correctness x time 48.78 1, 24 < 10−6 .67
Condition x correctness x time 10.29 1, 24 < .005 .30
Number of trials Condition 0.38 1, 24 n.s. .02
Correctness 0.05 1, 24 n.s. < .01
Condition x correctness 0.27 1, 24 n.s. .01
Table listing the main and interaction effects of analyses of variance. All factors were within-subjects factors. Condition: feedback versus no feedback on
performance (for each participant half of the trials were randomly assigned to the feedback and half to the no feedback condition). Correctness: correct
versus incorrect performance (correctness depended on the individual participant’s performance in the given trial). Time: ﬁrst versus second credibility
ratings (participants rated the actors’ credibility before and after performing the emotion recognition task).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581.t001
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the interaction effect or any of the differential mean update scores in the Condition (feedback
given / no feedback given) by Correctness (correct / incorrect task performance) design (all
p’s> .2, even without Bonferroni correction). Thus, more emotionally perceptive subjects were
not more or less likely to denigrate actor credibility.
Control analyses showed that positivity bias evident in the updates
scores resulted from differences in second credibility ratings
Did update scores differ because of baseline differences that were already present before perfor-
mance feedback (i.e., in the first credibility ratings)? To exclude this possibility, we analyzed first
and second ratings separately. Ideally, ratings of the actors’ depictions should not differ between
the conditions before the emotion recognition task. Instead, all relevant differences should
emerge after the emotion recognition task. In our study, this was the case as detailed below.
In a Condition X Correctness ANOVA on first credibility ratings, the two main effects were
not significant (all p’s> .1; see Table 1). We found a small but significant interaction effect at
the .05-level (F(1,24) = 5.58; p = .027; see Fig 2A and Table 1). However, this interaction cannot
account for the pattern observed in the updating scores—especially not for the cases in which
participants received feedback. When performing individual t-tests between the four condi-
tions no comparison survived Bonferroni correction. Only a trend emerged for those trials for
which participants subsequently received no feedback: Participants rated stimuli which they
subsequently answered incorrectly slightly higher than those which they subsequently
answered correctly (t(24) = 2.64; p = .07). Additionally, mean first ratings did not differ from
the midpoint of the rating scale, which was at 0.5 (in one-sample t-tests against 0.5 all p’s
were> 0.2).
Importantly, the pattern described above for updates emerged in the Condition X Correct-
ness ANOVA on second ratings: The interaction and the main effect of Correctness were sig-
nificant while the main effect of Condition was not (see Table 1). Additionally, mean second
ratings differed from the midpoint of the rating scale for items for which participants had
received feedback (correct performance: t(24) = 2.70; p< .05; incorrect performance: t(24) =
-3.23; p< .05) but not for items for which they had not received feedback (all p’s> 0.5).





Condition x correctness -2.00
First ratings Intercept 20.57
Condition 0.57
Correctness -0.08
Condition x correctness -1.06
Second ratings Intercept 11.04
Condition 1.76
Correctness 2.11
Condition x correctness -3.26
Table listing the main and interaction effects of linear mixed effects models. Condition: feedback versus no
feedback on performance; Correctness: correct versus incorrect performance. See Table 1 for more details
on the factors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581.t002
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The above control analyses show that particular effects related to their first credibility rat-
ings cannot account for participants’ updating pattern. Notably, regression to the mean cannot
explain updating since the first ratings did not differ across conditions and from the midpoint
of the rating scale.
Supplementary analyses show that reactions in the performance task
followed the expected pattern
As common in many performance tasks, participants were faster for correctly versus incor-
rectly answered items in the emotion recognition task (RT correct items: mean = 3431 ms;
SD = 617 ms; RT incorrect items: mean = 3833 ms, SD = 698 ms; t(24) = 7.87; p< 10−7). For
two separate reasons, we did not analyze RTs for the credibility ratings. First, credibility ratings
were given using a slider on a visual analogue scale and thus RTs depend on the distance
between the initial and the final position of the slider. Second, credibility ratings constituted
our main dependent variable of interest and we had no specific hypothesis for the RTs associ-
ated with credibility ratings.
Attributional style questionnaire (ASQ)
To compare our assessment of the positivity bias in the current task with a previous measure of
the positivity bias in attribution, participants completed the ASQ, which is the most widely
used measure [7]. In line with previous reports the total score was higher for positive than for
negative events (see Table 3). To explore the relationship between updating behavior in our
task and attributional style as measured by the ASQ, we correlated the total ASQ score for posi-
tive events with updates after receiving feedback for correct performance and the ASQ score
for negative events with updates after receiving feedback for incorrect performance, respec-
tively. The former (Pearson’s r = .45; p = .06) but not the latter (p> .5) showed a trend for a
correlation after Bonferroni correction and the strength of the two correlations differed signifi-
cantly as determined by Steiger’s z (z = 2.05; p< .05; see Fig 2B).
A positive correlation between updates after positive feedback in our task and the total ASQ
scores for positive items suggests that participants with a greater tendency to rate the credibility
of the actors higher after receiving positive feedback on the task were more likely to attribute
positive events to internal, global and stable causes.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to show a positivity bias in attributions using a decision-making task.
In this task, participants rated the credibility of the depiction of different facial emotions by
actors before and after receiving performance feedback on an emotion recognition task with
Table 3. Attributional style questionnaire (ASQ).
Positive events Negative events t df p Cohen’s d
Mean SD Mean SD
Internality 72.9 9.3 70.0 13.9 < 1.00 22 n.s. .18
Stability 74.1 9.5 63.1 13.8 3.97 22 < .001 .83
Globality 81.5 15.8 70.0 16.7 3.03 22 < .01 .63
Total 228.1 27.2 202.4 34.8 2.86 22 < .01 .60
T-tests compared the scores for positive and negative events.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148581.t003
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the same items. This setup overcomes important drawbacks inherent to classic descriptions of
the positivity bias in attributions: Our task assess attribution implicitly following real (and not
imaginary) performance feedback and we obtain baseline ratings of the stimuli. Crucially, we
show that attribution processes are relevant for decision-making. In accordance to our hypoth-
eses, participants changed their beliefs of the task-relevant stimuli depending on the perfor-
mance feedback they received. That is, participants evaluated the stimuli more positively after
having received feedback on correct task performance and more negatively after having
received feedback on incorrect task performance. This constitutes evidence for a self-serving
bias because feedback on incorrect performance—which according to attribution theory is
attributed to external, unstable, and to specific causes—leads to a downgrading of the stimuli
(i.e., the actors’ credibility). In contrast, feedback on correct performance leads to a change
towards the positive. A similar pattern emerged to a lesser degree when no feedback was given,
which may indicate that participants can to some degree infer whether their performance was
correct or incorrect even without receiving explicit performance feedback. Updates after receiv-
ing positive feedback were related at trend level to the scores for positive items of the ASQ,
which constitutes the most commonly used explicit measure of attributional style. We did not
find a significant relationship between updates after receiving negative feedback and ASQ
scores for negative items.
Merits of attribution theory
In our view, merits of attribution theory rest on two of its facets. First, it points out that differ-
ent types of causes can determine outcomes such as task performance. In contrast, models in
the decision neuro(science) literature often abstract away from the potential multi-causality of
real life events [30,31]. Second, the empirical evidence that meta-cognitive assessments of cau-
sality tend to be self-serving nicely link attribution theory to a wider literature on self-related
positivity biases [52–54].
Overcoming the drawbacks of previous investigations of the positivity
bias in attribution
Our procedure overcomes three important drawbacks of previous demonstrations of the self-
serving bias in attribution: First, it does not include explicit meta-cognitive assessments of cau-
sality, which are difficult to generalize to more implicit real life settings. Rather it is an indirect
measure of attribution processes, in that it measures feedback related changes in the evaluation
of the actors’ credibility. Here, participants are neither explicitly asked to infer the causes for
their correct or incorrect performance after the emotion recognition task nor are they
prompted to take the feedback on the independent emotion recognition task into account
when judging the actors’ performance a second time. This difference with respect to traditional
meta-cognitive assessments of attribution styles ensures that participants implicitly shift their
ratings towards the positive after receiving feedback on correct performance and towards the
negative after receiving feedback on incorrect performance.
Second, performance feedback was given on a narrowly framed emotion recognition task, in
which participants received both correct and incorrect feedback. Previous studies have often used
loosely defined complex events or even imagined events (as for example in the ASQ). Our study
design rules out the possibility that participants just imagine hypothetical events in a biased way,
which would constitute a bias in imagination but not a bias in causality attributions.
Third, we elicited participants’ beliefs before and after performance feedback. Thereby, we
exclude the possibility that self-serving attributions appear because of initial properties of the
stimuli, which cannot be controlled for with a single assessment.
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Relation to classical assessments of attribution
Similar to previous studies [16], we enhanced the self-relevance of the task by telling participants
that they would receive a scoring of their performance with respect to others at the end of the
study. To further increase the study’s ecological validity and saliency to participants, the task
comprised dynamic facial emotional expressions of a large number of male and female actors of
varying ages. We ensured optimal task difficulty (i.e., avoiding ceiling and floor effects) by includ-
ing a large number of emotional expressions. We acknowledge, however, that in contrast to tradi-
tional, direct assessments of causal attribution, our task design cannot distinguish between
different types of self-attributions. Nevertheless, the correlation between updates after positive
feedback and the total ASQ scores for positive items suggests that the attribution processes in our
task and in the most commonly used traditional measure are related, at least to some degree.
Relation to other positivity biases in feedback processing
Conceptually related positivity biases have been described when participants receive self-rele-
vant feedback on their future or on their character traits [33,35]. Desirable feedback leads to a
greater belief update than undesirable feedback. Here, we provide evidence that the processing
of performance feedback can result in a similarly biased updating pattern as described by the
self-serving attribution bias: The evaluated credibility of actors depicting facial emotions
changes toward the positive after desirable performance feedback (i.e., feedback indicating that
the depicted emotions were correctly recognized). The inverse was true after undesirable feed-
back (i.e., feedback on incorrect emotion recognition).
In the current task, participants could not choose whether to receive feedback or not. Previ-
ous research indicates that feedback seeking can in itself be positively biased [55]. After failure
but not after success feedback for an unrelated anagram task, humans seek more positive than
feedback negative about their personal abilities. Thereby, they may avoid having to make attri-
butions for negative feedback. Such a pattern could be easily tested in version of the current
task, in which participants can decide after each emotion recognition question whether they
get feedback or not. Taken together, these findings highlight the question if all of these biases
can be integrated into a common account.
Motivational accounts and their relation to psychiatric disorders
As indicated by the label “self-serving bias,” usually motivational accounts are brought forth to
explain the empirically observed pattern that healthy individuals attribute positive outcomes
(including correct performance) internally but negative outcomes (including incorrect perfor-
mance) externally [1,2,8,56]. Motivational accounts are often highlighted because of their rele-
vance for understanding maladaptive behaviors and beliefs in psychiatric populations. In line
with this notion, psychiatric populations, especially depressed patients, typically show a less
biased attribution pattern [7,10]. Depressive patients also show a reduction in positively biased
updating for future life events [34,57]. Future studies would ideally use a similar design as we
did here to establish the relevance of the implicit self-serving bias for psychiatry.
Adaptiveness of positively biased attribution
So far, the questions whether and why biases such as a positively biased attribution pattern can
be adaptive have been notoriously difficult to address ([58], for related discussions see [59–
61]). One possibility is that a positively biased assessment of causality leads individuals to
spend their scarce resources on solvable tasks for which they can easily improve their abilities.
In this sense, the adaptive nature of the bias strongly depends on individuals’ current
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environment. Extensions of our task design offer the possibility to manipulate how much par-
ticipants benefit from positively biased performance feedback processing. We predict that in
such cases the magnitude of the bias would depend on its adaptive nature.
Interestingly, previous research has shown that in some cases stigmatized groups tend to
attribute negative feedback in an adaptive way; that is they think that others rated them nega-
tively because of stigma-related stereotypes (see [62] for an example where African Americans
receive feedback on an essay from a Caucasian evaluator and attribute negative feedback to ste-
reotypes against African Americans). Based on these findings, we predict that groups with a
stereotype of poor emotion recognition skills may exhibit an altered attribution pattern in our
task. For example, they may attribute negative performance feedback to the stereotype and
may therefore not update their credibility ratings following negative feedback.
Challenges to the motivational account
Despite the widespread motivational interpretation of internal attributions of correct perfor-
mance versus external attributions of incorrect performance, the “self-serving” nature of this pat-
tern has been challenged since its early demonstrations [58]. Contestants have argued that the
cognitive explanations are better suited to account for the empirically observed causality attribu-
tions [56,58]. Cognitive explanations include assertions that positive outcomes are attributed
internally because they are more consistent with individuals’ expectations or their actions. Alter-
natively, individuals may have different standards of proof for correct and incorrect performance.
Although a consensus in the literature seems to be that motivational and cognitive factors are
often intertwined and are not mutually exclusive [8,56], we still argue that efforts should be made
more precisely characterize their respective contributions. In this regard, our implicit assessment
shows that a positivity bias emerges even in the absence of explicit assessments of causality. In
our view, the fact that participants’ initial ratings of items were similar, independent of whether
they subsequently received feedback on correct or incorrect performance, makes explanations
relating to individuals’ expectations unlikely. That is, participants could not anticipate a certain
performance feedback during their first assessment. Additionally, we hold it unlikely that partici-
pants explicitly considered different standards of proof for positive and negative performance
since they were not prompted to provide explicit causality statements. Furthermore, future stud-
ies could extend our task design by varying the reliability of the information provided or by
assessing participants’ confidence. This may help to dissociate effects related to motivational
influences from effects related to information processing.
Limitation
We used a visual analogue scale with a slider that started in the midpoint of the scale to elicit
participants’ credibility ratings. This may have anchored participants’ responses to the mid-
point of the scale. In addition, the use of a slider makes reaction times dependent on the differ-
ence between starting and ending positions and we therefore do not report exploratory
analyses of reaction times of participants’ ratings. We preferred a constant anchoring to the
midpoint for all trials to a varying anchoring to a random point on the scale. The latter would
have necessitated an elaborate dissection of the trial-by-trial differences in anchoring in order
to obtain corrected estimates of participants’ credibility ratings. Ideally, our results should be
replicated in a free response format.
Conclusions
To summarize, our study shows that the self-serving attribution bias emerges in an task akin
to those used in the decision-making literature. We showed that positive and negative
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performance feedback on an emotion recognition task changes the individual’s initial credibil-
ity rating for a displayed emotion in a positive or negative way, respectively. We found evidence
for a relation between our implicit measure and one of the most commonly used explicit mea-
sures for positive events. We strongly expect the observed pattern to hold over a variety of
tasks and stimulus classes as long as task and stimuli are perceived as self-relevant and reason-
ably easy, thereby avoiding that participants merely attribute performance to task difficulty.
The wider implication of our study is that it links attribution theory to theories of feedback
processing in decision-making. As predicted by attribution theory, whether individuals incor-
porate past performance feedback into their future decisions, depends on the extent to which
they hold themselves responsible for the feedback they received.
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